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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Probability arguments as used in the early Greek sources are (by definition) those which 
appeal to commonly held beliefs. This “popular” source makes for an important contrast 
to some recent versions of probability. Kraus attends to the role of such arguments in 
early rhetoric and philosophy in a detailed way. A few issues are explored, particularly 
when dissent yields consent. 
 
2. THE TEXTS  
 
Probability arguments as used in the early Greek sources are those which appeal to 
commonly held beliefs. One appropriately distinguishes between shared beliefs and 
opposed beliefs, given their different degrees of acceptability. The rhetoricians' advice 
about how to work with either of these to make a case for something one wants to 
convince others of is certainly well taken. Making the case for something on the basis of 
things one’s audience already believes is a mark of reliability: the hearers won't question 
whether the premises are true. This occurs when the premises are commonly known. The 
speaker then has to help the audience to either discover the unrealized implications of 
what they already believe, or that what they saw their view as proving wasn't actually 
justified by the other things which they believed. These differ with respect to their place 
in the justification intended 
 Following upon Plato's account of Tisias's definition of probability (or that of 
Corax, (Kraus p. 2)) in the Phaedrus, "that which the many think" (273b), to say that 
there is a strong tie between what is (presumably at best) probable, and that it is the 
object of opinion, emphasises that the many are taken to not know (assuredly, without 
doubt) why whatever they believe is true, is true.  But nevertheless, they have beliefs. 
(Recall that to Tisias, "probability is superior to truth", at least if you can establish 
something in accord with the audience's beliefs – truth apart from or opposed to that 
would be more difficult to establish.) Thus, the familiar case follows in which a smaller 
man charged with assaulting a larger but cowardly man should lie in court, as should the 
victim. 
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the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that 
they were alone, and should argue thus: "How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong 
man like him?" The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore 
invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. (ibid.) 
 
Relying on the probabilities, the effort is to sway the jurors of the unlikelihood of the 
cases made by their opposite. Because the smaller adversary seems to common 
understanding less able to subdue the larger, the jurors might be vulnerable to accepting 
his testimony. (Hobbes would have interesting comments on this.) 
 Similarly, the Pseudo-Aristotelian author of the Rhetoric to Alexander – which 
Kraus plausibly attributes to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (p. 5) - appeals to probabilities 
as believed positions for key foundations in making the case for other things; his view 
follows (1428a25-34): 
 
Such, then, is the nature of a probability [as the sympathy of the audience].  
[BECAUSE] We must, therefore, always carefully notice, when we are speaking, 
whether we are likely to find our audience in sympathy with us on the subject on which 
we are speaking;  
FOR in that case they are most likely to believe what we say.  
[ALSO BECAUSE] It is a probability when one's hearers have examples in their 
own minds of what is being said.  
For instance, if any one were to say that he desires the glorification of his 
country, the prosperity of his friends, and the misfortunes of his foes, and the 
like, his statements taken together will seem to be probabilities;  
FOR each one of his hearers is himself conscious that he entertains 
such wishes on these and similar subjects.  
 
(By indenting a passage, above, the suggestion is that it justifies what is above it and to 
the left). This begets the question whether the appeal to examples introduces a 
justification of probabilities, i.e. that it is because they have the examples in their minds 
that the members of the audience will grant the propositions, or instead is this just 
another reason why we should attend to the audience’s response to our words? The 
argument is stronger if offering an independent justification because the role of examples 
does not exhaust the kinds of positions one might take based on consensus, but it does 
buttress the position that the audience’s previous experience can be appealed to as an 
enhancement to the argument’s reliability: it promotes shared belief. There is ambiguity 
on the 'subject' because is could be the topic (generally) or the data appealed to in the 
proof. (See Kraus p. 5) 
 Both the view of Tisias and that of Alexander’s author are intriguingly consistent 
with the “common-sense” view of Toulmin, according to whom "to say 'S is probably P' 
is to commit oneself guardedly, tentatively, or with reservations to the view that S is P 
and likewise guardedly to lend one's authority to that view" (pp. 53). The notion of 
“commitment” here appealed to suggests something that a reasonable person ought to 
accept. This is worth noting because many recent accounts of probability emphasise a 
quantitative, rather than qualitative, account. Thus, Whately: “One should mathematically 
compute possibilities because each diminishes the strength of the other premisses with 
which they are combined.”(b iii, § 14, p. 138-9). Hoaglund emphasises attention to 
probability, noting that between possibilities and premisses which are “general or 
common knowledge” as features of their reliability (p. 160), some might suffer reductions 
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in credibility if other premisses converging to the same conclusion call into question their 
probability (p. 181-2). Kraus has it right that probability is here conceived differently (p. 
4), appealing to the qualitative sense. An issue does arise concerning whether the term 
‘probability’ should be surrendered in favor of ‘plausibility’ (p. 5), but the reference to 
Hacking (p. 4) is well taken: the “frequency-based statistical analysis” is a seventeenth 
century and later phenomenon. 
 Aristotle says “probability” is a "generally approved proposition" (An. Pr. II.27 
70a2), key in the formation of enthymemes (each of which is a "syllogism starting from 
probabilities" (a10)). This is so, Aristotle says, because they are important for 
establishing the middle term. The middle term is the link between the major and minor 
terms occurring in the conclusion, so having such a role will be important to ensure that 
the premises appealing to them are sound, or at least not likely to be questioned by the 
audience. (Aristotle goes on to point out how the enthymemes are thus challengeable, 
because even if appeals to probabilities as what is true "for the most part" may be 
appropriate, the fact of their probability rather than necessity introduces the basis upon 
which they might be challenged.) 
 For Aristotle this style of reasoning will be crucial, as fans of the Nicomachean 
Ethics realize. Deliberation is crucial in relation to the use of practical wisdom to answer 
practical moral questions, particularly about the things which cannot be known of 
necessity: the person of Practical Wisdom bases their assessment of the mean (between 
excess and defect) on probabilities grounded by experience of a society, and in relation to 
capabilities of the individual moral agent. (These are the "continuous and discrete" 
qualities appealed to to distinguish the moral and intellectual virtues.) 
 
There are few facts of the 'necessary' type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of 
the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with 
alternative possibilities.  
For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a 
contingent character;  
BECAUSE hardly any of them are determined by necessity. (Rhet. 1357a22) 
 
 In Aristotle's analyses of probabilities in the Rhetoric, for instance, his principles 
for the kinds of things one can rely upon for the audience's approval cover many of the 
circumstances in which deliberation might yield a new belief, and therefore the things 
one might appeal to to show the alternative possibilities. Kraus’s taxonomical list 
(section 4.2) is here appropriate. (The caveat to this is its exhaustiveness: some 
archaeologist friends once said that all non-flesh or food artefacts at a dig are either tools, 
vessels, or ornaments – that’s it.) It would also be worthwhile to know when else 
probability arguments are not appropriate.  
 
2. A CHALLENGE ABOUT DISSENT 
 
There are cases, however, in which there is a curious (both) sharing of a stance and 
disagreement upon it, which are further worthy of exploration. Notably here is Aristotle’s 
defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics 4.4 (1006a14 ff.), a 
peirastic (elenctic) argument in which there is serious controversy between the 
3 
JEFFREY CARR 
disputants, but Aristotle's appeal here is precisely to a kind of shared territory that even 
the denier must visit in order to make her case.  
 This is not a probability argument, although in the sense that there is a dispute, the 
denier of PNC at least is defending the view that doing so is possible: to her, it is neither 
an arche nor a necessary truth, and false, so her view is (to her at least) probably true: 
there is warrant for it. Bolton records that this is properly a case of the peirastic style of 
argument: one tentatively accepts one's opponent's point of view, to see what follows. 
Ideally, it is to reduce it to absurdity (p. 329). So, the proponent of PNC asks their 
adversary (disputant) to make her case. The snag is that in asserting the denial of the 
PNC, the speaker means what she means and intends the words which she has uttered to 
express the meaning that they have, and not their contradictories. In asserting the denial 
of the PNC, she has agreed to a shared set of argumentative standards with the proponent 
of PNC, but by doing so, has refuted herself in trying to establish her view. 
 However, this is still an appeal to the coherence of the account one might make of 
anything, on the basis of a consensus of standards to deal with the dissent in the details. 
In denying the PNC, the disputant must still consent, for the credibility of her case, to the 
meaningfulness of language, among other things. So, here at least, dissent on one front 
yields consent at the next. 
 
3. CONCLUSION  
 
Kraus’s account of how probability arguments appeal to “general common sense 
warrant” (p. 3) is entirely appropriate. Reference to the sources provides ample evidence 
of this, particularly in contrast to quantitative approaches to probability by means of the 
amount of evidence. Some questions are noted. 
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